A behavioral model on the decision of seeking care and adhering to treatment

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A Behavioral Model For The Demand For Health Care

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Abstract

This paper aims to propose a general model to describe individual's decision of seeking health care. The model assumes that the decision to seek care and adherence to treatment depends on the individual's expectations about their outcomes and future health status, sociodemographic characteristics and contextual factors, as well as the existence of co-occurring conditions. The main novelty of the model is the inclusion of behavior and contextual variables as predictors of the demand for health care services. We show how these two new arguments allow to predict more accurately individual's behavior than previous behavioral models.

Aims and Contribution

We propose a parametric predictive model for seeking health care that combines the principles of behavioral economics and individual's response to health expectations to predict health care behavior and compliance. Combining these theories with Andersen's behavioral model of utilization of health care services we designed a mathematical model. The aim of our model is to predict individual's decisions towards seeking and using health care services along with changes in the barriers to access those services.

Data (for testing the model)

Data: Sample of patients seeking care in MA in 2009-2012, with Mental Health diagnosis. Patients under 18, out of MA, with public insurance only were excluded. Providers out of MA or with missing data were also excluded (N=1230).

Methods: Random effects regression model including: Xi control variables (age, gender, race, county of members & provider); other regressors (2) insurance type, subinsurance status (blue indicator), full insurance indicator, Charlson Index, cost variables and Type of clinic. Dependent variable is a continuous variable maximum number of claims by patient. The analysis is done at the individual level (seeking care model) and at the individual level (adherence model).

Yi = Xi + Zi + Yi + εi

Non rationality problem: the individuals don't seek care when they needed because of barriers on access to health care.

Figure

The demand of health care services as a function of pre-deposing characteristics.

Preliminary Results

<table>
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<th>Adherence Model</th>
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Outline

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Introduction

Modeling the demand for health care and utilization of services remains of central importance.

rossman model (1972) has to be a reference but still there are many things to be analyzed that may matter when making decisions (Sepehri, 2015; Usher, 1975; Zweifel, 2012).

In modeling the usage of health care services studies often fail to account for contextual factors such as socio-demographic factors, predisposing and enabling characteristics, health insurance coverage and healthcare workforce composition potentially affecting the individual’s decision of seeking care.

However, nor Andersen (1995) or Gelberg’s models (2000) accounted for the determinants of adherence to care.
Evidence shows that societal determinants may also influence the utilization of health care services (Andersen and Newman, 1973).

Not considering these contextual and societal determinants of medical care utilization may lead to inaccurate estimations of the utilization of health care services (Philips et al., 1998; Mechanic, 1980).
Aims and contribution

This paper aims to investigate why individuals decide not seeking care or not adhering to the prescribed treatment.

This model could be used to forecast the individual’s decision of using health care services and to identify conditions that enable or preclude the usage of those services.
We propose an approach to model the individual’s decision in a model where the two stages, seeking care and treatment adherence, are considered.
The proposed model builds on the original behavioral model by Andersen (1986, 1995) and the demand for health and health care model by Grossman (1972).

From Andersen:

1. **contextual variables** which includes environmental factors and health care system characteristics, individual’s characteristics or predisposing/enabling factors to use health care services (e.g., demographics, social structure, and present and future health expectations), factors that enable or impede such use of services (e.g., personal/family, and community resources) that ultimately define health care needs

2. **health behaviors**

3. **health outcomes** (e.g., patient’s satisfaction)
The Model

The model incorporates uncertainty surrounding the incidence of illness, the effectiveness of medical care, and the depreciation of the stock of health.

The stock of health in our model decreases not only with time (Grossman’s health depreciation factor), but also, because of individual health behaviors and the existence of co-occurring conditions.

What we offer is a theoretical approach trying to fill (at least in part) those gaps in previous models.
The Model (theoretical framework)

An individual $i$ has a health condition and thus, should decide whether to seek care at any time $t$.

An individual seeks care with certain probability when the marginal utility of seeking care is equal or greater than its marginal cost. We assume that the individual’s stock of health depreciates over time at a larger rate if she decides not to seek care when sick, has other co-occurring conditions or engages in unhealthy behaviors.
Glossary

$H_t$ — Health status
$x_0^p$ — Initial predisposing characteristics
$r^p$ — Charlson Index
$a$ — Weight of behavior over individual’s health needs
$\delta$ — Depreciation rate
$B$ — Indicator of health behavior
$\alpha$ — Proportion of $H_t$ restored through behavior
$\theta$ — Co-occurring conditions indicator
$PH_t$ — Perfect Health
$u_G$ — Utility from other commodities
$P_H$ — Total cost (price) of health care
$s(h)$ — Proportion of the cost of paid by third party (payer)
The Model

We start by defining individual characteristics, $X_i$, as a vector of three components: predisposing characteristics ($x^p$), enabling resources ($x^e$), and health care needs ($x^n$).

\begin{equation}
X_{it} = (x_{it}^p, x_{it}^e, x_{it}^n)
\end{equation}
The predisposing characteristics are represented by the following function:

\[ x_t^p = u(x_{t=0}^p - r^p \cdot (H_{t+1} - H_t | \theta_t = 1)) \quad \forall(H_{t+1} - H_t | \theta_t = 1) \leq 0 \]

We assume that the utility of seeking care based on the individual predisposing characteristics cannot be negative.
The Model

Enabling characteristics are measured by the following expression:

\[ x_t^e = P_t'(H_t) \cdot H_t + P_t(G_t) \cdot G_t \]

For:

\[ P_t'(H_t) = P_{H_t} \cdot (1 - s(h)) \]

Let’s assume that the cost of health care is a function of health insurance \((h)\). We use prices to proxy health care cost. Thus, \(P_H\) is the total price of health care and \(P_{H_t}(1-s(h))\) is the individual copay (i.e., out-of-pocket cost - OOP). Prices are assumed to be known and set up by the health care system. We also assume that copays vary depending on the type of health services and the individual copay depends on the type of health insurance.
The Model

Health care needs: initially, health needs are represented by the distance between health status and Perfect Health. This can be reduced by adding behavior

\[ x^n = u((PH_t - H_t) - a \cdot (H_{t+1} - H_t | B = 1)) \]

\[ \forall (H_{t+1} - H_t | B = 1) \neq 0 \]

\[ H_{t+1} > H_t \iff \text{Health Investment} \]
The equation for health investment is given by the expression:

\[ I_t = B \cdot \alpha \cdot H_t \]

\[ H_{i,t+1} = H_{i,t} (1 - \delta_{i,t}) + B_{it} \cdot \alpha_{it} \cdot H_{it} \]

Where \( \alpha \) represents changes in the health status due to (positive or negative) health behaviors. If the individual decides not to engage in any health behaviors \((B=0)\), the health investment effect over the health care needs would be null and therefore \( x^* = u((PH, - H_i)) \).
The Model

Scenario 1: The decision of seeking care

The individual maximizes the following utility function:

$$\text{Max } U_{it}(.) = u_H + u_G + (u_H \cdot u_G) \quad \forall u_H = x^p + x^n, \quad \forall u_G = u(G)$$

$$x^e = P_H \cdot (1 - s(h)) \cdot H_t + P_G \cdot G_t$$

$$\text{Max } U_{it}(.) = \left[ (x_0^p - (r^p + a) \cdot (H_{t+1} - H_t \theta, B) + PH_t - H_t ) + u_G \right] + \left[ (x_0^p - (r^p + a) \cdot (H_{t+1} - H_t \theta, B) + PH_t - H_t ) \cdot u_G \right]$$
Even if the individual needs seeking care, there is a condition that, if satisfied, the individual might decide not seeking care. We show how his condition is defined by the combination of risk aversion, the ability to restore health through behavior, health depreciation, and the impact of health investments.

\[
H^*_t = \frac{(P_G + x^e) \cdot [- (r^p + a) \cdot (-\delta + B \cdot \alpha) - 1] + P_{H_t} \cdot (1 - s(h)) \cdot (1 + PH_t)}{-P_{H_t} \cdot (1 - s(h)) \cdot x_0^p}
\]
The Model
Scenario 1 (SOLUTION)

Model Solutions. Scenario 1. Seeking care: We find that even if the individual is in need of seeking care, there are conditions that, if satisfied, the individual is going to decide not seeking care.

\[ H_i^* = 0 \iff P_{H_i} = \frac{(P_G + x^r)\left(\frac{r^p + a}{1 - s(h)} - (\delta + B \cdot \alpha - \theta \cdot \pi) - 1\right)}{1 + PH_i} \]

Rationality: \( H_i^* = 0 \) and \( a = \frac{-1}{(-\delta + B \cdot \alpha - \theta \cdot \pi)} \cdot r^p \)

Irrationality: \( H_i^* = 0 \) and \( a < \frac{-1}{(-\delta + B \cdot \alpha - \theta \cdot \pi)} \cdot r^p \)

Note that \( a < a^* \) makes the marginal utility of seeking care positive
The Model
Scenario 2: Treatment adherence

The individual decision concerning treatment adherence in future time periods is conditioned to have sought for care at \( t=0 \). Therefore, we can derive the optimal value for \( H_{t+1}^* \).

\[
H_{t+1}^* = (1 - \delta + B \cdot \alpha) \cdot \left[ \left( P_G + x^e \right) \cdot \left( -r^p + a \right) \cdot (- \delta + B \cdot \alpha) - 1 \right] + P_{H_t} \cdot (1 - s(h)) \cdot (1 + P_{H_t}) \]

\[
- P_{H_t} \cdot (1 - s(h)) \cdot x_0^p
\]
Therefore, the possible reasons lead to the individual not to adhere to treatment in future periods are:

1. The health depreciation rate is higher than the net marginal effect of health investment ($\delta \geq 1 + B \cdot \alpha$)

2. Not having sought care at time $t$ ($H_t^* = 0$ implies $H_{t+1}^* = 0$).

3. The price of health is the maximum price that the individual is willing to pay

If $u_G = G$, the price equals: $P_{H_t} = \frac{(P_G + x^e)\cdot[-(r^0 + a)\cdot(-\delta + B \cdot \alpha) - 1]}{(1 - s(h))\cdot(1 + PH_t)}$
Discussion

Model Implications for policy design

Barriers on demand

Barriers on Supply
We draw the demand of health care to look at how maximum prices that the individual would be willing to pay for health care services go down if the individual receives no co-financing aid to pay the cost of health care.

The maximum willingness to pay being higher than the maximum price the individual can pay (given the budgetary restriction). A and B represent optimal solutions.
Barriers on Demand

They will affect the Marginal Utility of seeking health care. An individual may experience some change that makes less attractive to seek care. In the figure, an individual would decrease the demand from health care services from the quantity allocated in point A to $H_t$ allocated in point B.

To return the demand for those individuals to the initially optimal ($H_t^*$) one possibility would be to give more aids to the individuals, reducing their OOP payments for health care services. That will move the budgetary restriction downwards until the new marginal utility equals the prices.
Barriers on the supply

In S’ the individuals can access to less number of providers than in S. When that happens, there is in the short term a reduction in the demand for health care services. However, in the long term, to return the demand to its initially optimal level, policies should focus on increasing the marginal utility of seeking for health care.

As the prices rise due to the reduction of the number of providers in the health care market, increasing the utility from engaging in healthy behaviors we could ideally switch MgU to D’.
The proposed model represents an adaptation of the Andersen (1986) behavioral model and Grossman (1972) health care demand model. The model accounts for variables significantly correlated with care-seeking behaviors in response to health problems/conditions.

The main contribution of this paper is our analysis of the impact of uncertainty and negative health investments on the decision of seeking care and adhering to treatment.
Concluding remarks

The model is built on the principles of behavioral economics, Andersen’s model for the decision of seeking care and Grossman model for the demand for health.

In our model, we incorporate uncertainty through the possibility of suffering from co-occurring conditions, contextual variables and explore how supply and demand barriers affect to individual’s decision of seeking care and adhere to treatment.

The model seems to reflect real behavior on both scenarios, care seeking and treatment adherence, and could be useful for policy makers in the design of health promotion policies.
End

Thank you for your attention!

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